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NOTES
THE GROWING SHADOW OF TRADE
PROTECTIONISM
History has taught us an important lesson: free trade serves the cause of
economic progress and it serves the cause of world peace. 1
Frequent calls are being made to end the United States' free trade
policy with foreign nations. Critics of free trade claim that United
States products cannot compete in a world market where most coun-
tries consider "free trade" the exception, not the rule. Critics also argue
that a "free trade" policy harms both the United States laborer and
businessman. Support increases for imposing trade barriers on foreign
competitors attempting to cut into the United States market.
Cries for a "protectionist" trade policy, oddly enough, have
emerged most recently from diverse camps on the political spectrum:
industrial labor groups2 and conservative Republicans.3 These groups
aim to protect the ailing auto and steel industries in the United States,
as well as create a perception abroad that the United States demands
fair treatment from foreign nations on trade issues. With the market
glutted by ever increasing imports of cheaper and more fuel efficient
automobiles from Japan and Western Europe,4 as well as imports of
other cheap steel and steel products,5 United States industry and labor
have teamed to prod the President and Congress to act on the increas-
ingly unfavorable balance of trade.6
No industry has suffered more as a result of the unfavorable bal-
ance of trade than has the United States auto industry. This note will
analyze the recently introduced Fair Practices in Automotive Products
Act, designed to protect the American auto industry from the threat of
1. President Ronald Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1511
(Nov. 26, 1982).
2. House Passes Auto Domestic Content Bill, CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., Dec. 18, 1982, at 3072.
3. The new politics of U.S. protectionism, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 27, 1982, at 39.
4. "As the demand for small, fuel-efficient vehicles climbed from 37 percent [of the U.S. mar-
ket] in 1970 to around 65 percent today, the variety, quality, and fuel efficiency of many
foreign models made them attractive to U.S. buyers." STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON TRADE OF
THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 97TH CONG., 2D SEss., DOMESTIC CONTENT
LEGISLATION AND THE U.S. AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY: ANALYSIS OF H.R. 5133, THE FAIR
PRACTICES IN AUTOMOTIVE PRODUCTS ACT 17 (1982) [hereinafter cited as COMMITTEE
REPORT].
5. In the winter of 1982, Europeans were selling carbon steel in the United States at $500 a ton,
with government subsidy of $130 a ton. Meanwhile, only 31% of steel plant capacity has
been in use in America. Letter to New York Constituents from Senator Daniel Moynihan
(D-N.Y.) (Dec. 3, 1982) [hereinafter cited Moynihan Letter].
6. The United Auto Workers say the United States-Japan trade deficits in autos have totaled
$47 billion over the past 5 years. Wall St. J., Dec. 16, 1982, at 2, col. 3.
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foreign auto imports. This "domestic content" legislation7 would im-
pose "minimum domestic content ratios" on foreign automobile im-
porters.8 The legislation, theoretically, would restore auto industry
jobs by restricting the number of imported cars and parts that enter the
United States market. Realistically, however, such legislation repre-
sents the United States' attempt to unilaterally revive an industry
which no longer holds a competitive edge.
THE NEED FOR AN AUTOMOBILE TRADE POLICY
Many argue that the United States needs to revise its trade policy.9
Adverse changes in the international economy have required that the
President and Congress take some initiative to cure these ills. '0 To un-
derstand the current situation it is essential that one have a clear pic-
ture of the United States auto industry as it stands against its most
serious competitor, the Japanese auto industry.
In 1982, United States auto production fell nineteen percent from
the previous year, to its lowest level in twenty-four years." United
States automakers assembled five million cars in 1982, down from
198 l's disappointing figure of 6.2 million units.'2 As one might suspect,
the United States auto industry has taken a beating at the hands of the
Japanese in the area of subcompact autos."' United States automakers
are selling fewer and fewer "entry level" models.' 4 In 1982, Japan sold
forty-nine percent of the 3.2 million subcompact cars marketed in the
United States.' 5 That figure was up from forty-eight percent in 1981
and forty-five percent in 1979.16
The causes for the disparity between Japanese and American auto
sales in the United States are numerous. First, United States auto man-
ufacturers cannot presently build a subcompact auto and sell it at a
profit. 7 According to some estimates, America's "Big Three"
automakers t8 lose as much as $1,000 on every subcompact they sell. 19
Second, United States auto workers earn approximately $8 an hour
7. H.R. 5133, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 2300, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
8. Id.
9. CoMMi"rEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
10. "It has been the mass purchasing of foreign products, including oil, over the past 30 years
which is principally responsible for the disasterous state of the United States economy today.
Further, it can be stated, without equivocation, that the the nation's economy, despite the
handwringing protests of free trade advocates, will continue to decline steeply unless sub-
stantial tariffs and quotas are imposed." Mattera, Imports Aided Economic Slide, Chicago
Trib., Jan. 25, 1983, at 11, col. I.
!1. Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1983.
12. Id.
13. Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1983, at 1. A "subcompact" auto refers to the smallest passenger vehicles
allowed on the highway.
14. "Entry level" models refer to the models consumers most often purchase as their first car.
15. Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1983, at 1.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. General Motors, Ford Motor Co., and Chrysler Corp.
19. Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1983, at 1.
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more than Japanese workers,2" despite the fact that Americans build
cars more slowly than do the Japanese.2 ' Third, American consumers
perceive Japanese cars to be more comfortable and less prone to
mechanical failure than their American counterparts. As a result,
thousands of American workers have lost their auto manufacturing
jobs.
Between December 1978 and April 1982, in the United States, the
number of automobile manufacturing jobs plummeted from 762,400 to
459,700.22 The Congressional Budget Office attributes these declines to
four factors: (1) slow economic growth and record high interest rates;
(2) increased productivity growth in the United States auto industry, as
manufacturers attempted to meet heightened foreign competition;
(3) increased auto imports; and (4) increased "offshore sourcing" of au-
tomobile components as auto makers attempted to reduce production
costs.
23
Presently, Japan voluntarily imposes auto export quotas on itself.
24
With these quotas, Japan limits auto exports to the United States to
1.68 million units annually.25 Japan originally intended this self-re-
traint to produce a seventeen percent share of the total United States
market. Dismal United States auto maker sales the past two years al-
lowed the Japanese instead to capture 21.7% and 22.6% of the market
in 1981 and 1982, respectively.26
This situation has forced the United States auto industry to ac-
knowledge the choke hold that the Japanese presently have over the
Americans.27 Chrysler Corporation Chairman Lee Iacocca advocates a
further reduction in the number of cars Japan may export to the United
States, from 1.68 million to 1.5 million.28 Iacocca believes "it is time we
told the Japanese to knock it off."29 Further, United States auto mak-
ers complain that the Japanese yen is undervalued and that Japan's tax




21. According to James Harbour, an automobile consultant in Detroit, better factory layouts and
more flexible use of workers enables Japanese auto makers to assemble a small car with
approximately 15 man-hours of labor, compared with as much as 30 hours for American
producers. Id.
22. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
23. Id.
24. Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 1983.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Robert Stempel, general manager of GM's Chevrolet division, says, "If I had a better sub-
compact than the Chevette, I wouldn't be able to increase volume with it much" because it
would be overpriced in a heavily competitive market. Peter Griffin, a part-owner of Ford
and Datsun dealerships in New York and Connecticut, stated "I wouldn't put an Escort side
by side with a Datsun because I wouldn't be able to explain the price difference." Wall St. J.,
Jan. 7, 1983, at 4.
28. Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 1983.
29. Id.
30. In his essay, Lawrence Mattera, one of the founders of the National Council on Economic
Policy, reports that until recently, our trading partners levied an average duty of 15% on
[Vol. 10:382
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As the trade war rages between the United States and Japanese auto
industries, the American unemployment figure nears eleven percent.
Analysts predict a slow, uneven recovery from the recession, 31 and that
1983's average unemployment rate will settle around the 10.5% mark.
32
The unemployment figures in the auto industry are likewise high,33 and
do not hold out much hope for the laid-off auto worker's future.34
One can trace the genesis of the auto industry's decline to its failure
to retool and produce subcompact cars during the 1974 Arab oil em-
bargo. The industry had a responsibility to its consumers to recognize
the demands the embargo would produce, but failed to timely recog-
nize those demands. Five years later, when oil supplies were again de-
pleted during the Iranian revolution, the American consumer
discovered that his own auto industry had neglected to heed the warn-
ings of the first embargo. In short, the domestic consumer felt betrayed
by the industry. Since the late 1970s, American buyers, failing to sup-
port domestic auto manufacturing, have opted for the cheaper and
more fuel efficient foreign autos.
Given the plight of the American auto worker and the frustration of
American manufacturers, efforts to spark political action come as no
surprise.35 As Senate leaders openly threaten "limited warfare" against
Japan and Western Europe on trade issues, 36 one staff member predicts
that a trade reciprocity bill that died in the Senate last year "will come
back with more teeth in it."' 37 Within this political climate, "domestic
content" legislation, designed to protect the American auto industry
from foreign competition, is a measure likely to rise again in the near
future.
EXAMPLES OF PROTECTIONISM IN THE 20TH CENTURY
The concept of developing trade policies designed to protect domes-
tic industries is not new to the United States. In fact, debates over
adoption of protectionist legislation have raged in Congress since the
1930's. Two measures, the Tariff Act of 1930, and the Buy American
Act, in 1933, deserve brief analysis. These measures are chosen for
American cars, while we charged only three percent on theirs. Chicago Trib., Jan. 25, 1983,
at I1.
31. Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 1983.
32. Id.
33. As of March, 1982, 250,000 auto workers were reported on indefinite layoff. For each layoff
by an auto maker, an estimated 2.2 persons are laid off in the firms supplying the auto indus-
try. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 100 (issue brief by Dick D. Nanto, Economics
Division of the Congressional Research Service).
34. Some analysts have estimated that mere automation within the auto industry could eliminate
up to 200,000 jobs by 1985. For the 1980s, the "growth rate" within the industry could
actually turn out to be an annual decline of 1.7% of the employment force. See CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, DISLOCATED WORKERS: ISSUES AND FEDERAL OPTIONS. 97th Cong., 2d,
Sess. (July, 1982).
35. Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 1983.




contrasting purposes: one act remains in force today, while the other
failed shortly after its adoption.
First, the failure. The Tariff Act of 1930,38 better known as the
Smoot-Hawley Tariff, is a prime example of "protectionism." During
this period, as America entered the Great Depression, factories began
closing and workers stood in unemployment lines. Congress feared
that American jobs were being sacrificed as a result of liberal entry of
foreign goods and decided to discourage imports. Tariffs on the im-
ports of most goods were increased and the President was empowered
to increase duties by up to fifty percent on goods coming from countries
refusing to deal fairly with the United States.39
This tariff policy had a devastating impact on the United States and
the world. In two years, as foreign nations began to build protective
tariffs of their own, American imports and exports had declined by
two-thirds.40 Up to this time, America had premised its foreign com-
mercial policy on the equality-of-treatment principle allowing for au-
tonomous tariffs. This policy permitted foreign nations to place tariffs
on those American imports which could be produced most cheaply in
the United States, and permitted the United States to place tariffs on
foreign goods which could be produced most cheaply abroad. The
Smoot-Hawley Tariff, however, placed tariffs on a great range of for-
eign products which United States manufacturers could not produce in
quantities approaching domestic consumption needs. Foreign coun-
tries, convinced that the United States was determined to shut out their
products, retaliated by raising their own tariffs. A "Catch-22" situation
developed, and the world settled into a deepening depression.4'
Despite the failure of the Smoot-Hawley protectionist legislation,
one measure adopted in the 1930's, and still in force today, was the Buy
American Act.4 2 Since 1933, this Act has required government agen-
cies to prefer American made goods and materials over foreign goods
and materials when awarding government supply, service, and con-
struction project contracts.43 Government agencies are free from the
strictures of the Act only when the procuring agency has determined
that the use of domestic items would be "inconsistent with public inter-
38. Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 590, ch. 497 (1930).
39. "(d) Duties to offset Commercial Disadvantage-whenever the President shall find as a fact
that any foreign country places any burden or disadvantage upon the commerce of the
United States... he shall, when he finds that the public interest will be served thereby, by
proclamation specify and declare such new or additional rates of duty as he shall determine
will offset such burden or disadvantage, not to exceed 50 per centum ad valorem or its
equivalent." Id. at 705.
40. Moynihan Letter, supra note 5.
41. For a fine analysis of the Smoot-Hawley Tariffs effect on the world economy, see J.M.
JONES, TARIFF RETALIATION: REPERCUSSIONS OF THE HAWLEY-SMOOT BILL (1934).
42. 41 U.S.C. § 10a (1976).




est," or the cost would be "unreasonable."" Enacted in 1933, along
with President Roosevelt's other New Deal measures, the Buy Ameri-
can Act provided one means to protect the American worker.45 As
Senator James J. Davis (Pa.) noted at the time, "the adoption of this
amendment will mean work for our workers. It will help stem the tide
of foreign competition and thus prevent further reduction of wages for
the American worker.
46
The Fair Practices in Automotive Products Act, a measure likely to
come before the 98th Congress as it tackles the auto industry dilemma,
can be seen to fit clearly within the context of 20th century
protectionism.
THE FAIR PRACTICES IN AUTOMOTIVE PRODUCTS ACT
On December 15, 1982, by a vote of 215-188, the House of Repre-
sentatives approved H.R. 5133, the Fair Practices in Automotive Prod-
ucts Act.47  Although the approval came only after adoption of a
"weakening" amendment,48 the bill's foundation remained intact. The
Act would institute minimum "domestic content" requirements for
most passenger vehicles and light trucks sold in the United States.49 In
the Senate, however, the Finance Committee failed to report the bill,
thus killing its chances for passage in the 97th Congress.5
H.R. 5133 would have placed "domestic content" requirements on
each domestic and foreign automaker producing more than 100,000
44. Id.
As might be expected, litigation arising from the Act has centered on the definition of
"domestic construction material" as contained in the Act's corresponding regulations. 41
C.F.R. § 1-18.6 (1982). § 1-18.601 defines "domestic construction material" as "an un-
manufactured construction material which has been mined or produced in the United States,
or a manufactured construction material which has been manufactured in the United States
if the cost of its components which are mined, produced or manufactured in the United
States exceeds 50 percent of the cost of all its components."
Also, disappointed bidders have challenged the agency's determination that acquisition
of domestic items would be "unreasonable." Allis-Chalmers v. Friedkin, 635 F.2d 248 (3rd
Cir. 1980).
45. 635 F.2d at 257.
46. 76 CONG. REC. 1933 (1933) (Remarks of Senator Davis). For a fine analysis of the original
application of the Buy American Act, see Knapp, The Buy American Act. .4 Review and
Assessment, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 430 (1961). For a current analysis of case law application of
the Act, see Annot., 58 A.L.R. FED 312 (1982).
It is remarkable how the floor debates in the House of Representative on the "domestic
content" legislation in 1982 were so strikingly similar to the debates in Congress over its 1933
Buy American Act. For example: "Mr. Chairman, I think the real point the gentleman from
Arkansas is making is that this particular bill is not a bill to deal strictly with problems of the
automobile workers. It is to deal with problems of all Americans, the farmer, the automobile
worker, all other workers." 128 CONG. REC. H9883-84 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982). (statement
of Rep. English).
47. Id. at H9909.
48. The amendment, adopted by a vote of 195-194, stipulated that provisions of the bill would
not supercede the requirements of international treaties, conventions or agreements on tariffs
and trade. Id. at H9898-99.
49. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
50. CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., Dec. 31, 1982, at 3156. The Senate Finance Committee held hear-
ings December 17 and 18, 1982, but did not report a bill.
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units for sale in the United States market. Any material or part pro-
duced in the United States and used in the manufacture of a motor
vehicle is defined as a "domestic part," and goes to make up the domes-
tic "content" of an auto." H.R. 5133 would have applied to "any on-
the-highway, four-wheeled or three-wheeled, passenger automobile;
and any automobile truck having a gross vehicle weight of less than ten
thousand pounds."52  The content requirements, would have been
graduated according to the volume of vehicles sold by each manufac-
turer.-3 After the first year, increasingly stringent requirements would
have been imposed until 1985, when the bill's provisions were to be
fully phased in.54 Adoption of the bill would have meant that Japanese
automobiles, the sales of which numbered over 2.2 million cars in the
United States in 1982,-- would have been required to contain thirty
percent of American "content" in 1983, sixty percent in 1984, and
ninety percent in 1985.56
ANALYSIS OF DOMESTIC CONTENT LEGISLATION
In its report to the House Ways and Means Committee, the Con-
gressional Budget Office (CBO) presented a laundry list of primary and
secondary effects the domestic content requirements would have on the
United States economy and the domestic auto industry.57 The legisla-
tion's secondary effects include the following: a general slowdown in
51. S. 2300, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1982).
52. CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 8.
53. Id.
54. The table below sets forth the auto content requirements.
No. Vehicles Sold in U.S. Required minimum percentage of U.S. Content
Requirement
1983 1984 1985
fewer than 100,000 0 0 0
100,000 to 149,999 8.3 16.7 25.0
150,000 to 199,999 16.7 33.3 50.0
200,000 to 499,999 25.0 50.0 75.0
500,000 or more 30.0 60.0 9010
S. 2300, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101 (1982).
55. Wall St. J., Jan. 6, 1983, at 2.
56. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 8.
57. Among the primary economic effects:
(1) The bill would displace about 2.4 million foreign cars by 1990, increasing the demand for
domestically produced vehicles by about 1.6 million units;
(2) employment in auto and auto-related industries would rise by about 211,000 jobs more
than otherwise by 1990;
(3) the implied restrictions on auto imports would invite retaliatory trade measures by U.S.
trading partners, resulting in higher domestic auto prices and with it the overall rate of
inflation;
(4) as a result of the displacement of resources caused by assumed retaliatory trade restric-
tions imposed by U.S. trading partners, by 1990 the Consumer Price Index would stand
about 0.2 percent higher, real Gross National Product would be about 0.3 percent lower;
and the overall unemployment rate would stand 0.1 percent higher than otherwise; in the
absence of retaliation from trading partners, real GNP would increase 0.4 percent by
1990; unemployment would drop from 0.2 to 0.4 percentage points; and the Consumer
Price Index would increase by 0.3% to 0.7 percent in 1990.
Id. at 9-12.
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foreign economic activity; appreciation of the dollar on the world's cur-
rency exchanges; losses in United States auto production efficiency; and
larger auto industry wage rate increases. 8
Proponents of domestic content legislation argue that in the short
run unemployment would be reduced because foreign auto manufac-
turers would establish more production facilities in the United States.5 9
Opponents contend that this overestimates the commitment that the
Japanese auto industry would make to secure its spot in the United
States marketplace. It is one thing to establish foreign auto dealerships
in America, but it is quite another and more complex situation to relo-
cate the means of production from abroad to the United States.
Even if Toyota and Nissan, the largest automobile importers to the
United States, located their production facilities here, adoption of do-
mestic content legislation would require that these companies, by 1985,
place ninety percent American "content" in their autos. Given this hy-
pothetical situation, not only would these companies have to relocate
their assembly, stamping, engine, and transmission facilities to the
United States, but they would also have to purchase domestic parts and
materials, or relocate their Japanese suppliers as well. 0 This hypotheti-
cal, however, appears unlikely to occur. The legislation's ultimate ef-
fect, and perhaps its supporters' intention, would be to force the
Japanese to hold their American exports under 100,000 units, or else
face the prospects of having to mix American component parts into
their autos.6 This amounts to nothing less than outright imposition of
quotas on foreign imports.
Support for the domestic content legislation has emerged from both
the auto industry and the United Auto Workers (UAW). Conservative
political groups, have also supported adoption of the legislation. Rich-
ard Viguerie, conservative fund-raiser and publisher of Conservative
Digest, states: "we should let our trading partners. . . know that their
automobiles, electronic components, cameras, watches, steel, and other
products will not continue to be welcome into our economy unless they
show a greater willingness to give American products the same consid-
eration."62 Similarly, Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) wants more
United States agricultural export subsidies to "fight fire with fire" by
matching European subsidies.63
The UAW has pushed heavily for passage of domestic content legis-
lation. The UAW estimates that enactment of a domestic content bill
would create or preserve 941,000 auto-related jobs in the United
States,' and that any inflation resulting from the bill's implementation
58. Id. at 12.
59. Id. at 78.
60. Id. at 28.
61. Id. at 29-30.
62. The New Politics of U.S. Protectionism, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 27, 1982, at 39.
63. Id.
64. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 68.
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would be "quite modest. ' 65 "Whatever one concludes about increased
prices," says the UAW, "they must be compared with the benefits of
employing an additional 941,000 workers. 66
The UAW also discounts the possibility of trade retaliation by for-
eign countries should Congress enact domestic content legislation.
They point to the "more restrictive trade policies employed by the
Europeans," but which have not, the UAW claims, been challenged
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947.67 The
UAW believes that "an acceptable international policy toward the auto
industry can be negotiated only when the United States shows that it is
prepared to counteract the policies of others. As the last major auto
producer to take action to assure the viability of its auto industry, the
United States can hardly be considered to have initiated a 'trade
war.' "68
Opposition to the domestic content legislation has generally
emerged from those who adhere ideologically to a concept of "free
trade," and from those who merely feel the bill's concept is impractica-
ble. Senator John C. Danforth (R-Mo.) reflected the general skepti-
cism toward the measure when he stated that the overwhelming
majority of Congressmen viewed the bill as a "perfectly ridiculous
piece of legislation. 69 While House proponents were working for pas-
sage, opponents argued that the bill would undoubtedly aid auto work-
ers but would ultimately lead to higher automobile prices and could
possibly trigger retaliation by United States trading partners.7 ° Many
in Congress who opposed the bill did believe that some trade policy
reform was in order.7
Despite the UAW's support for domestic content legislation, and its
rather optimistic predictions regarding the legislation's effect on the
United States economy, the Congressional Budget Office, in its report
65. Id. at 71.
66. Id. at 72.
67. Id. The General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 is a vehicle by which nations may
meet to discuss trade and reduce tariffs. The agreement originally intended that all nations
adhere to a policy of free trade (low tariffs, or none at all), but today only the United States
remains a free economy with a minimum of government subsidy. All in all, GATT has been
relatively powerless in the past several years. See generaly, Moynihan letter, supra note 5.
68. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 73.
69. House Passes Auto Domestic Content Bill, CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., Dec. 18, 1982, at 3072.
Other Congressmen commented that "[the bill] is deeply flawed legislation. It will not-re-
peat, will not-put American auto workers back to work. Frankly, there is cause for serious
concern that the bill will cost jobs by accelerating foreign trade barriers against U.S. ex-
ports." 128 CONG. REC. H9906 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski,
D-Ill.). Comments were also made that "[flree trade is beneficial to American jobs and to the
American consumer. Trade restrictions such as the domestic content bill are clearly detri-
mental to American jobs and American consumers." Id. (statement of Rep. Derwinski, R-
Ill.).
70. CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., Dec. 18, 1982, at 3072.
71. "We have a fine line between two very harsh positions. We cannot continue to let the U.S.
be the patsies of our trading partners, but we can't let legislation like the local content bill get
so far out of line that we start an international trade war." Remarks by Rep. Michael Barnes
(D-Md.), quoted in The New Politics of U.S. Protectionism, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 27, 1982, at 38.
[Vol. 10:382
Trade Protectionism
to the Ways and Means Committee, generally opposed the bill. The
Budget Office argued that whatever benefits would accrue to the
United States auto industry, they could be "more than offset" by the
costs imposed on the rest of the United States economy. 2 The CBO
report reflects the Reagan Administration's fears that passage of do-
mestic content legislation would not only prompt retaliation from
United States trading partners, but also raise American auto prices by
up to ten percent, and cost the economy from three to five billion dol-
lars overal.
73
Opposed by the Ways and Means Committee and the Reagan Ad-
ministration, domestic content legislation appears doomed. Passage of
H.R. 5133 by the House during the 97th Congress' "lame duck" ses-
sion, however, raises doubts about the blatant political motives for the
bill's earlier support.
By approving the Fair Practices in Automotive Products Act in De-
cember, 1982, the House of Representatives adopted the strongest piece
of protectionist legislation since the Smoot-Hawley Tariff in 1930.
7 4
Congressmen genuinely felt that the American economy would sink
deeper and deeper into the recessional abyss unless the legislature ac-
ted. At the very least, the measure's passage sent a message to the
United State's trading partners that unless trade barriers were eased
abroad, most notably in Japan, United States domestic pressures might
grow so strong as to make adoption of some form of United States
trade barriers inevitable.
75
Though protectionism is tempting, it is a trap that the United States
must avoid.76 Protectionist policies, at best, provide only quick-fix so-
lutions to much deeper problems. Adoption of such a rigid trade policy
as domestic content legislation, as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff has proven,
leads to retaliation after retaliation by trading partners. Consumers
72. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 10. The CBO does not mince words in its analysis:
The net benefits to the U.S. economy implied by [the economic analysis] results, how-
ever, are the consequence of the low level of economic activity and resource utiliza-
tion that many forecasters anticipate for the next several years. If the U.S. economy
were operating closer to full capacity, the beneficial effects would be cancelled out
entirely. Indeed, in a fully employed economy, the net effects. . . would probably be
negative. The employment and output gains in the U.S. auto industry would be at the
expense of production and unemployment elsewhere in the economy. . . Thus, even
without retaliation, the net effect of [domestic content legislation] on the U.S. econ-
omy would be negative.
Id. at 11.
73. Morrow, The Protectionist Temptation, TIME, Jan. 10, 1983, at 68.
74. Rep. William Dannemeyer (R-Cal.) proposed an amendment to the domestic content bill to
rename it the "Smoot-Hawley Trade Barriers Act of 1982," and states that its purpose was
"to reduce competition in the auto industry, protect jobs in one industry to the detriment of
jobs in other industries, and to increase the price of automobiles to consumers." The House
rejected the amendment by the vote of 92-301. See debate and vote on amendment, 128
CONG. REc. H9865-9909 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982).
75. Sen. John Danforth (R-Mo.) dismisses this argument, stating that "a country begins very
quickly to lose its credibility if the signals it chooses to use are asinine on their face." CONG.
Q. WEEKLY REP., Dec. 19, 1982, at 3072.
76. See generally Morrow, supra note 73, at 68.
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will ultimately pay the price for the American auto industry's lack of
foresight and failure to produce small, cheap, efficient, and comfortable
cars. As Senator John Chaffee (R-R.I.) recently noted, "it is very easy
to kick the Japanese around to account for our own deficiencies" in
business, labor, and government economic policies.77 While Chrysler
President Iacocca has called for further reduction in Japanese imports
to the United States,78 he fails to note that the present limit is self-
imposed by the Japanese. Iacocca has not expressly endorsed the es-
tablishment of unilateral quotas or tariffs, yet supports the domestic
content concept, which indirectly imposes those quotas.
CONCLUSION
The auto industry, its workers, and the consumers, must all realize
that America will no longer have a monopoly on world automobile
production. We must admit to ourselves that other nations can now
produce some goods better and much more cheaply than American
manufacturers, just as America produces many other goods, including
food, much better and more cheaply than other nations. Adoption of a
trade barrier such as the domestic content bill means America is un-
willing to be honest with itself.
The best method to extinguish talk of a protectionist trade policy is
to restore confidence in our own economy. America's and the world's
economic problems are not caused by a single nation and cannot be
solved by unilateral "trade" policies. Trade negotiations, economic
summits and the like will produce the best long-term solutions to trad-
ing inequities. The recent visit to America by Japanese Prime Minister
Nakasone had several encouraging results,79 the greatest being that
leaders of the two "warring" nations openly discussed the problems
facing their respective countries.
By endorsing the domestic content legislation, those seeking to pro-
tect the American auto industry have endorsed the imposition of a
powerful trade barrier, without having to use loaded words such as
"tariff" or "quota." Congress and the President must be prepared to
reformulate economic policy to reduce unemployment and the budget
deficits. Only in that manner will Washington convey a message to the
hapless auto industry, its workers, and the employed and unemployed
77. Chicago Sun Times, Jan. 22, 1983, at 15.
78. Morrow, supra note 73, at 68.
79. Both President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone warned against protectionist trends
that could set off disasterous trade wars. Nakasone has recently initiated tariff cuts on 323
items, raised Japan's defense budget, ended a 16-year ban on exporting military technology
to the United States, and vowed to streamline import procedures. By these actions,
Nakasone risks political embarrassment at home. Chicago Sun Times, Jan. 22, 1983, at 15.
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across the nation, that the only thing we have to "fear" is protectionism
itself.
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